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Abstract
This essay is an explication of the role of messianism, often expressed as hope, in
the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’s single philosophical project from 1933 until
his passing in 1996 was to establish ethics as first philosophy. This effort was in
opposition to the primacy of ontology in the work of Martin Heidegger. Levinas uses a
phenomenological method similar to Heidegger’s to establish messianic hope as a
fundamental human motivation. Throughout Levinas’s work, he borrows a religious
vocabulary from his Jewish heritage that he resets into a philosophical domain. He takes
a religious concept of messianism, specifically Jewish formulations of messianism, and
associates it with the human affect of hope. Messianic hope becomes a persistent theme
in all of Levinas’s work. This essay will explore the origins of this terminology, the role
of temporality, and how he uses messianic hope throughout his work to further his
philosophical aims.
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Introduction
Hope is Not a Strategy was the title of a popular business book from a few years
ago. Practically, hope is not a cognitive state but more of a wish. It is not a plan or an
activity and does not provide a way forward. While hope probably does not make a good
strategy for the aspiring entrepreneur, it is a critical part of the strategy of Emmanuel
Levinas’s philosophical project. The ambition of his project is considerable and
fundamental – to establish ethics as first philosophy. That is to put ethics before ontology,
epistemology, and, certainly, aesthetics. That is to make ethics the foundation on which
all other philosophy will then rest. It is not to establish a system of justice or morality, but
simply to put ethics first among all other considerations. This essay will not address the
success or failure of this project but will look at one key element of Levinas’s method,
that is his use of certain religiously charged terms. These terms are clustered around the
idea of a Messiah, specifically a messianic era and eschatology. In some of his work,
these concepts are front and center, and other times they are only implicit. The messianic
ideal threads its way through the entire course of his work. This essay will show how
Emmanuel Levinas situates his messianism, derived from his Jewish background, as the
driving force of his philosophy.
Like many other thinkers from the twentieth century, Levinas is very critical of
the Western philosophical tradition. A tremendous amount of effort during this period
1

focuses on rethinking and redefining fundamental issues of philosophy. In this mode of
thought, when Levinas uses the term “ethics” in announcing his project as, “establishing
ethics as first philosophy,” he uses the term in a very specific sense. He is not talking
about setting up a set of principles to guide the specifics of human behavior. Philosophies
of morality, justice and politics provide the proper discourse for establishing the specific
rules and algorithms for these issues. His project is more primary, deriving ethics from
the self and speaks “…to the anarchical, interruptive grounding of self as self-for-another,
the ground of self in a pre-cognitive, unknowable, uncontainable, infinite mystery – an
occluded self-disclosure.”1 This is ethics arising from the self in relationship with
another. Levinas’s effort consistently presents itself as, “an attempt to replace all
accounts of the human condition that fail to appreciate our essential social existence with
one that does so.”2 Levinas is trying to make clear that the responsibilities of
intersubjective relationships are the most primary of human existence.
A fundamental presupposition of Levinas’s work is that, “philosophy and religion
exist in a relation of mutuality.”3 The interactions between Greek philosophy and the
religion of the Hebrew bible are evident throughout Levinas’s writings. “Levinas
employs terms such as ‘prophetic’ and ‘messianic’ in relation to ‘eschatological’ not to

1

Sarah Pessin, “From Mystery to Laughter to Trembling Generosity: Agono-Pluralistic Ethics in Connolly
v. Levinas (and the Possibilities for Atheist Theist Respect)”, International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, 24:5 (Nov. 2016) 617, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2016.1248128

2

Michael L. Morgan, The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 3.

3

Leora Batnitzky, Leo Strauss and Emmanuel Levinas: Philosophy and the Politics of Revelation (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.
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provide reactive tropes with which to counter philosophy but to express the uneasy and
intertwined relationship between Jerusalem and Athens.”4 Levinas understands and
values the intersecting discourses of Judaism and philosophy, but “…at no moment did
the Western philosophical tradition in my eyes lose its right to the last word; everything
must, indeed, be expressed in its tongue.”5 Simply, Levinas feels that certain religious
terms are better expressions of the philosophical concepts he attempts to analyze.
A second presupposition is that time is the fundamental condition. This is not
original with Levinas but has a long history stretching back to the ancients. Questions of
temporality are consequently integral to establishing messianic hope as the motivation of
his ethical project. Time and temporality will necessarily be a theme throughout this
essay.
This explanation will begin with the background and context of Jewish
messianism. In addition to providing definitions of the critical terms, it will also look at
their origins and motivations. It points to the relevant biblical period texts and, where
necessary, differentiates Jewish messianism from other traditions. It points to the
resources that Levinas will draw from.

4

Brian Schroeder, "Apocalypse, Eschatology, and the Death of God." In Nietzsche and Levinas: 'After the
Death of a Certain God', ed. Bettina Bergo and Jill Staufer, (New York: Columbia University Press,
2009), 172

5

Emmanuel Levinas and Phillipe Nemo, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillipe Nemo, trans.
Richard A. Cohen, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 24.

3

Chapter three of this thesis describes the structure of Levinas’s philosophical
messianism. It includes a discussion of its phenomenological development as well as how
his philosophical messianism emerges from this effort.
The fourth chapter looks at three different readers of Levinas and how they tried
to come to terms with his messianic ideal. It explores both Levinas’s chronological
development and the utility of the messianic concept.
This is followed by a short conclusion.

4

Sources of Levinas’s Jewish Messianism
A.

What is Messianism?

To make sense of terms such as: ‘messianism’, ‘messianic hope’, ‘messianic era’,
and ‘eschatology’, it makes sense to first define the term ‘Messiah’. Matthew V.
Novenson provides a sample of more than 15 definitions from prominent historians and
exegetes, and his list is by no means exhaustive.6 The word ‘Messiah’ is derived from the
Hebrew word ‘meshiach’ ()משיח, literally, the anointed one. To anoint someone or
something is a rite of consecration by dousing with oil. Novenson’s examples point to a
man, usually, but not necessarily, a priest, king, or warrior. He is expected to arrive or
become manifest at some undefined point in the future that will mark the beginning of the
eschaton, the eschaton being the final event in the divine plan, or simply the end of the
world.
There is no unifying myth regarding the Messiah that is common across all the
varying faiths and, at least within Judaism, there is no unifying myth at all.7 While there
is no central or guiding myth within the Jewish canon and commentary, a popular view

6

Matthew V. Novenson, The Grammar of Messianism: An Ancient Political Idiom (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 27-8.

7

Jacob Neusner, Messiah in Context: Israel’s History and Destiny in Formative Judaism (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1984), ix-xi.

5

can be derived from the various sources. Messianic narratives call for an apocalyptic
conflict in which the forces of evil are finally destroyed, history is suspended, and a nontemporal world of goodness and justice is established. This utopian world is ruled by a
political figure descended from King David and populated by all the righteous people
from history. The motivating and emotional core of messianism is the hope or desire for a
better and more just world. Patiently awaiting the Messiah is traditionally seen as a
virtue. There is no urgency in its expectation, and its mere expectation is accepted as
being beneficial for both the individual and the community.8
B.

Biblical Era

Before the writing of the various works that make up the Hebrew Bible, “…there simply
was no discourse about ‘messiahs’ in ancient literature.”9 The collapse and original exile
of the Judean nation in 586/587 BCE seems to be the initiating event of a messianic
narrative. The earliest conceptions of messianism among the Hebrews was centered upon
the resurrection of the Davidic line of royalty after the fall of the Judean monarchy.10 The
idea of returning or re-creating an idealized past is an obvious motivating factor. It is a
past reimagined and elevated into perfection. The ancient nation of Judea consisted of a
people defeated and exiled by the Babylonians, conquered by the Greeks, and dominated
by the Romans. Yet they were reminded every time they worshipped that they were the

8

Yehuda Liebes, Studies in Jewish Myth and Messianism (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1992), 62-3.

9

Novenson, Grammar, 25.

10

Marcus Bockmuehl and James Carleton Paget, Redemption and Resistance: The Messianic Hope of Jews
and Christians in Antiquity (London: T&T Clark International), 5.
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object of a special love from God and possessors of a distinctive destiny.11 The messianic
idea persisted in a direct correlation to the sense of powerlessness of the people. With an
all-powerful God, every set-back and every injustice is interpreted as a matter of divine
will leading up to an eventual triumph of good over evil.
Any number of citations, starting with Genesis and continuing through the
Hebrew Bible, can be used to support the prophecy of a future messianic figure.
However, the first prophetic references to a Messiah in the Hebrew Bible may occur in
Isaiah and are generally dated to before the destruction of the Northern Kingdom of Israel
in 722 BCE.12 This is the origin of the prophecy of a servant of the Lord, a descendent of
King David, who restores the chosen people to their rightful place.
There are many messianic references within non-canonical Jewish literature from
the Second Temple and early rabbinic period. There are sustained prophecies of a
Messiah and messianic eras following an apocalypse in both books of Enoch, Fourth
Ezra, the Baruch Apocalypses, the Testaments of the Twelve Prophets, and the Psalms of
Solomon. Essene texts found among the Dead Sea Scrolls are another source of messianic
references, including commentaries on Isaiah, Habbakuk, as well as the Damascus
Document, and the War Scroll.
Messianism is a prophecy that entails a deep disruption of the course of history.
From the first hints of the messianic idea, a future utopian world where justice reigns is

11

Neusner, Context, 78.

12

See, for instance, Isaiah 2:2-4, 4:2-6, 9:1-6, 11. A priority case can be made for Amos 9:11-15. Amos and
First Isaiah are dated from approximately the same era, but the references in Isaiah are more numerous
and explicit.

7

consistently interwoven with a close connection to apocalypticism. Ezekiel prophesizes
an apocalyptic war between Gog and Magog followed by a restoration of the Temple in
Jerusalem without an explicit reference to a Messiah. Ezekiel was a prophet from the
early part of the Babylonian exile, circa 550 BCE, but many scholars think the later
chapters (38-48) were inserted afterwards.13 As Gershom Scholem has pointed out, these
two parts (the apocalyptic and the utopian) of the messianic era, “…stand in antithetical
relationship: … the reign of darkness and the reign of light.”14 These two periods are
back-to-back in quick succession. First, the apocalypse involving the violent annihilation
and death of the current political order, followed by the birth of an ideal, second period of
peace and justice. The initial period of political collapse is often accompanied with
antinomianism and universal moral turpitude. There is a common understanding that this
two-step process of catastrophe followed by salvation flowed into Christianity where it
flourished but was entirely dropped within the Jewish tradition. Gershom Scholem
dismisses this idea.15 A mythic trope of an apocalypse followed by utopia is common
among both Jews and Christians. (This strain of two-part prophecies [Ezekiel is not the
only example], never becomes part of Levinas’s hope for the future. Experiencing the
horror of the holocaust first-hand apparently immunized him to its attractions.)

13

Marvin A. Sweeney, “Ezekiel.” In Jewish Study Bible, ed. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 1042-5.

14

Gershom Scholem, “Toward and Understanding of the Messianic Ideal in Judaism.” In The Messianic
Ideal In Judaism, By Gershom Scholem, trans. Michael A. Meyer (New York: Schocken Books,
1971), 6.

15

Ibid. 10.
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C.

Rabbinic Judaism and the Talmud

“Judaism is not the Bible; it is the Bible seen through the Talmud, through the
rabbinic wisdom, interrogation, and religious life.”16 The Talmud is more than 3,000 folio
pages recording the discussions of the early rabbis (approx. 200-500 CE), along with later
commentaries, as they consider what often may seem like the most arcane and random of
religious regulations. The rabbis’ individual opinions are recorded in detail. “There is,
thus, no set of principles by which all cases are measured symmetrically or equally;
instead we find the constant subordination of the general rule to the particular case.”17
The Talmud makes clear that it is not possible to define Jewish messianism. It is only
possible to partially enumerate the features of the various conceptions. There are no ‘ten
commandments’ or guiding principles of Jewish messianism, there are only various
collections of opinions. There are literally dozens of discussions regarding the Messiah
and the messianic age within the Talmud. In just a few pages of the Tractate Sanhedrin,
the following questions are discussed:18
Who is the Messiah? Most frequently, he is a descendent of King David –
Messiah ben David. Although there could be two Messiahs: Messiah ben Joseph, who

16

Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be? ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001),
76.

17

Oona Ajzenstat, Driven Back to the Text, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 55.

18

A reader may want to refer to: Tractate Sanhedrin, 97b-99a, also see associated commentaries on these
pages. Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore, John
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 59-96. For other Levinas Talmudic commentaries regarding
messianism see Beyond the Verse, trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994),
13-33, 53 -67, 177-87. Also see In the Time of Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 92-108.
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oversees the apocalypse, and Messiah ben David, who presides after the messianic
world.19 Because there are no accurate genealogical tables going back to 950 BCE,
anyone might be the Messiah. There is a rabbinic argument that the messianic age will be
brought on by the collective action of all humanity, in which case, everyone or anyone
could be the Messiah.
Who is the Messiah for? Some rabbis of a particularistic nature insist the Messiah
is only for the Jews. Rabbis of a more universalist bent think that the Messiah is for
everyone. Some rabbinic voices speculate that the Messiah is for everyone but the Jews.20
What characterizes the messianic age? The oldest construct considers it a time
when the Hebrew nation will be free of either the threat of or actual foreign domination.
One popular conception is of a world where there is no political violence or war. A
variation of this conception calls for a single world government. The most optimistic
version envisions a world free of all political and social violence. 21
How long will the messianic age last? A half dozen learned opinions range from
40 to 7,000 years.22
Is the coming of the Messiah conditional or unconditional? God promised a
messianic age, and it will come no matter what happens in the world; thus, it would be
unconditional. One conditional opinion is that the Messiah will arrive when the people of

19

Neusner, Context, 187.

20

Sanhendrin 98b, “There is no Messiah coming for the Jewish people”

21

Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 60-62.

22

Sanhedrin, 99a.
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the world have proved themselves worthy through repentance and just behavior. Another
conditional opinion states the Messiah will arrive only when the Jews have proven
themselves worthy. A popular opinion is conditioned upon the existence of 36 righteous
individuals in the world. Another conditional opinion makes the coming of the Messiah
dependent upon the antinomian behavior of all mankind. 23
There is clearly no single conception of traditional Jewish messianism. When
speaking of the Messiah or referring to the messianic age, any combination of these and
other traits may be intended.
Within Judaism, the messianic era and the “world to come” are sometimes
mistakenly treated as synonyms, but Talmudic scholars (and Levinas) draw careful
distinctions between the two concepts. Both ideas are examples of social imaginaries, that
is, a socially shared conception that some communities imagine that they will attain and
in which they will live. These conceptions of a moral order do not necessarily carry an
expectation of their actual fulfillment.24 They are both exemplars of ideal future
possibilities, but with different attributes and roles within messianic thought. The
messianic era exists in time, it could or will occur at a specific point in history and history
will continue after it has arrived. It is proposed as a concrete possibility in the future. The

23

Ibid. 98b. “During the generation that the son of David comes, the hall of the assembly of the Sages will
be designated for prostitution, and the Galilee will be destroyed, and the Gavlan, i.e., Bashan, will be
desolate, and the residents of the border who flee the neighboring gentiles will circulate from city to
city and will receive no sympathy. The wisdom of scholars will diminish, and sin-fearing people will
be despised. And the face of the generation will be like the face of a dog in its impudence and
shamelessness.”

24

Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 6.
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“world to come” is atemporal; if or when it arrives, history stops, time stands still, and
the recording of history ceases. The “world to come” is not of this world. It is an ideal,
mystical, or religious concept. It is an existence where no one ages, there is no conflict,
and everyone happily contemplates the divine intellect. The messianic era is a future
historical period experienced by the entire community and within which that community
benefits. The “world to come” is a personal experience enjoyed by a righteous few.
Within the messianic era, the possibility of political conflict and state-sponsored violence
exists but is avoided by the just intervention of the messianic king. Social conflict and
inequality may remain as concrete problems, but violence is unnecessary for the just
resolution of these situations. In the “world to come,” there is not even the possibility of
political or social injustice. It is the fulfillment of all religious promises.25
D.

Maimonides

Maimonides (1135-1204) was both a physician and the acknowledged leader of
his Jewish community. His most widely read work, The Guide of the Perplexed, reflects a
deep respect for both the power of natural philosophy and the profound utility of religious
practice. Unlike his other works, which are models of clarity and organization, The Guide
is deliberately indirect as it wrestles with issues at the crossroads of religion and
philosophy. He addresses issues like the infinite, temporality and the essence of the
divine with a literary style that juxtaposes the vocabulary of one domain with that of the
other.

25

Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1990), 59-67.
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According to Maimonides, the belief in the coming of the Messiah is a central
tenet of Judaism. He lists it as one of the 13 basic principles of Judaism, “We are to
believe as fact that the Messiah will come and not consider him late.”26 For Maimonides
the eschatological world, while it is always in the future, is not a period or place of
miracles and perfection. As a rationalist and Aristotelian, Maimonides begins a
secularization of the messianic idea. He writes that the messianic era, “…will be realized
in this world; which will continue in its normal course except that independent
sovereignty will be returned to Israel.”27 For him, “The messianic age has nothing of the
supernatural to it and is marked by no miraculous transformations of nature. It portends
no apocalyptic war and does not bring time to an end.”28
E.

Volozhiner and Kabbalah (Jewish Mysticism)

Levinas cites, among his Jewish sources, Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner (1749-1821)
and, particularly, his posthumously published book Nefesh ha’Hayyim. Levinas adopted
and adapted several concepts of Kabbalistic mysticism from this source. Levinas is not a
mystic. He uses the same standards that he applies to his study of the Talmud that,
“…remains consonant with a Hellenic model.”29 He appropriates various images and
symbols of the Kabbalistic tradition that highlight the special relationship that man has

26

Maimonides, A Maimonides Reader, ed. Isadore Twersky (Springfield, NJ: Behrman House Publishing,
1972), 422.

27

Ibid. 83.

28

Michael Fagenblat, A Covenant of Creatures: Levinas’s Philosophy of Judaism (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2010), 95.

29

Levinas, Beyond the Verse, 158.
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with the world and reciprocally that man has with the En Sof (without end or the infinite)
that is divine. A key take-away in the messianic context is the concept of Tikkun and the
importance of ethical human behavior. Richard Cohen writes that, for Rabbi Hayyim
Volozhiner, “…the divine realm itself depends on human ethical behavior. What is done
below establishes the above, for better or worse…moral behavior on the part of humans
produces a ‘healing’ or ‘repairing’ (Tikkun) of the created realm.”30 Humanity is partners
with God, and the world is perceived as incomplete, damaged, or in need of repair. It is
then humanity’s mission to complete God’s work. This results in a kind of inversion
wherein the subjective self acts as though he or she is God; an ethical god responsible for
relieving the suffering of the other and, ultimately, for repairing the world.
F.

Twentieth Century German-Jewish Messianism

In the first half of the twentieth century, a coterie of German-Jewish intellectuals
began rethinking Judaism and the role of Jews in a modern Europe. This was not a group
that was insular or any way isolated. It included figures like Walter Benjamin; religious
Jews including Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Gershom Scholem; as well as Jews
with a Marxist bent such as Ernst Bloch, Erich Fromm, and Georg Lukács.31 “The
messianic impulse appears in many forms in the Jewish generation of 1914… as a

30

Richard A. Cohen, Elevations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 268.

31

Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and
Enlightenment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 30.
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tradition that stands opposed to both secular rationalism and what has been called
‘normative Judaism.’”32
In the years during and immediately following the First World War, Franz
Rosenzweig (1886-1929) began to rethink the meaning of religious experience. His work
is an attempt to describe what is left over when all the myth, ritual, and metaphysics of
both Christianity and Judaism are stripped away. Peter Eli Gordon describes
Rosenzweig’s project as “…the question of what kind of ultimacy remains available
within the confines of the human experience once the traditional theological model of
redemption is abandoned.”33 A critical reappraisal of temporality is central to this project.
“Rosenzweig proposes a continuous understanding of time, for which past, present and
future become mutually informative indices within the given moment.”34 Rosenzweig
writes about the importance of the messianic impulse:
The future is no future without this anticipation and the inner compulsion
for it, without this ‘wish to bring about the Messiah before his time’ and
the temptation to ‘coerce the kingdom of God into being’; without these, it
is only a past distended endlessly and projected forward.35
Rosenzweig has faith that the messianic era is possible, a goal that can be reached in
reality.36

32

Ibid. 29.

33

Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005), 21.

34

Ibid. 196.

35

Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 227.

36

Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 192.
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It is worth mentioning two others from this group of German Jews: Gershom
Scholem and Ernst Bloch. The entire career of Gershom Scholem (1897-1982) was
devoted to the study of messianism and Kabbalah. In contrast to Christian ideas of
messianism, he maintained that Jewish messianism was “an event which took place
publicly, on the stage of history and within the community.”37 For Scholem, the
messianic impulse was a phenomena of the condition of exile consisting of the dynamic
forces of conservation of what is, restoration of what was, and utopian hope for the
future.38 Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) was a Marxist who had escaped the Nazis to take a
teaching position in the United States. He emigrated back to East Germany in 1955 to
teach philosophy at the University of Leipzig. “History for Bloch is predicated on a
future oriented knowledge that transcends the empirical order of things…[it] is directed
beyond the existing world toward a yet unrealized ‘messianic goal.’”39 His major works,
The Spirit of Utopia and The Principle of Hope, define messianism in a secular manner
while at the same time postulating an ideal and transcendent existence.

37

Scholem, Toward, 1.

38

Ibid. 2-3.

39

Rabinbach, Shadow, 44.
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Temporality and the Intersubjective Origins of Levinasian Messianism
A.

Phenomenological Ethics

In 1928, after completing his undergraduate work at the University of Strasbourg,
Levinas traveled to Freiburg Germany to study philosophy and, particularly,
phenomenology with Edmund Husserl (1859 -1938). Husserl advocates for a rigorous
method of phenomenological analysis:
Husserlian phenomenology involves the methodical analysis of lived
experience from which can be derived the necessary and universal truths
of all experience… Rather than proceed by abstract deduction or dialectic,
the phenomenological method enables consciousness to be become
reflexive, to recognize…[what] allows an object to emerge as meaningful.
The lack of presuppositions in such a method reveals the relation between
logical judgement and perceptual experience. Truth and meaning are
shown to be generated.40
Levinas uses a similar method, differing in a major respect. He wants to consider the
meaning of something that cannot appear at all, namely, the infinite. Levinas uses his
form of phenomenology in a project to counter the ontological primacy of the philosophy
of Heidegger, with whom he also met and studied. Levinas begins his project of

40

Hand, Sean, “Introduction,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge,
1989), 2.
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establishing ethics as first philosophy by abandoning all the presuppositions of sociality
and then examining an original social encounter.
To examine the intersubjective relationship, Levinas first considers the situation
of an individual independent of all social relations. He began this effort as early as 1935
in his essay, On Escape, and more fully in his immediate post-war writings. In Time and
the Other, Levinas explicitly rejects Heidegger’s conception of solitude “…in the midst
of a prior relationship with the other.”41 He posits an individual separated from and prior
to all social relations. Separating the subject from the social allows Levinas to examine
the solitary individual in relation to existence.42 He admits that while this is
anthropologically contestable, this most primal hypothetical condition allows for a more
revealing ontological analysis. This resulting solitary subject is in a situation that is tragic
and nauseating. A condition that reveals “… the indissoluble unity between the existent
and its work of existing.”43 This separated being is at once both completely free and
utterly imprisoned. In this primal solitude, the subject can do anything except escape
from its own finite being. Isolated in a private world, this separated creature experiences
time as an endless succession of nows. There is no future and there is no hope. This is a

41

Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 40.

42
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timeless, anonymous existence in which the separated being yearns to escape the
enchainment to oneself.44
This original creature is imbued with physical sensations and finds herself to be
both finite and needy. This sensibility constitutes the separated self. The sensations of
hunger and thirst rouse her from passivity and into a cyclical search for satisfaction. She
establishes a home to shelter herself from the weather and for a comfortable place to
sleep. All of the elements of the world are hers for the taking. These are objects that
either bring some kind of satisfaction or are without value. Everything, other than the
self, is categorized and then possessed, consumed, or ignored. This first party is a
separated being acting on the totality of the universe. The free use of the elements of the
world satisfies needs that generate sensations of enjoyment and happiness. This drive for
satisfaction is the only limitation on the freedom of the separated being. Everything is
available for the use and enjoyment of the same until the same meets the Other.45
Having established a separated self, Levinas uses the “face” to exemplify the
encounter with the Other – the second party of the intersubjective relationship. He writes,
“You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a
forehead, a chin, and you can describe them… The relation with the face can surely be
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dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face cannot be reduced to that.”46
This event of the encounter with the Other is unlike any ordinary sensation. The face of
the Other reveals an element that cannot be simply classified; it resists being possessed or
consumed, and it demands attention. The face is an oppositional force that exceeds
epistemology, ontology, and economies of all sorts. It brings into question all previous
presuppositions. This event fundamentally changes the separated being and her
relationship with the world she inhabits. For Levinas, it is probably not possible to
overstate the importance or the constitutive power of this first contact. It is the birth,
among other things, of subjectivity.
What is it about the face that is so creatively disruptive? The face is unlike
anything else in the world. This Other is absolutely unknowable, excessive, and original.
By encountering the face, we are forced to encounter the Other as something more than a
uniformed myrmidon.47 This is a subject that cannot be properly reduced to just their sex
or their race. They exceed the classifications of their social standing or profession. By
encountering the face, the same is confronting an utterly unique individual that cannot be
properly categorized or fully comprehended. “There is a disproportion between the
act…” of being faced with a face “…and that which the act gives access.” We are
incapable of truly knowing them; instead, when we encounter the face we become
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engaged in a relation – a relation without relation – with a trace of absolute alterity, the
ineffable. This is “…the idea of the Infinite, where the ideatum of this idea, that is, what
the idea aims at, is infinitely greater than the very act that thinks it.”48 To encounter the
face of the Other is to have access to the trace of the infinite that is divine.49 This is a
revelation without a vision. It is not a proof. It is a transcendence into an ethical situation
and not a theological position. It is the sensation of and a relationship with the radical
alterity of the Other. “The first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ It is an
order.”50 With this commandment, the guiltless freedom of the self is effectively
constrained, a new order of obligation is constituted, and subjectivity arises.
This confrontation with the face of the Other generates a burst of fruitful
conceptions, not the least of which is language. Quoting Levinas,
Face and discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that it
renders possible and begins all discourse. I have just refused the notion of
vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Other; it is discourse
and, more exactly, response and responsibility which is the authentic
relationship.… In discourse I have always distinguished, in fact between
the saying and the said.51
The very presence of the Other demands a response. We meet the Other and we are
compelled to say: good day, bonjour, shalom, aloha, salaam alekhem, or guten tag. We
immediately give a blessing to the Other. That compulsion reveals our responsibility to
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the Other. More than words, the very presence of the Other communicates. The face tells
us more than we may want to know. By encountering the face, we confront their
vulnerability, poverty, suffering, and helplessness. The excess of the Other conveys more
than words can express.
This first encounter with the Other constitutes the subjective self that is
“essentially, primarily, and fundamentally” responsible for the Other. In Levinas’s
interview with Philippe Nemo, he says, “I understand responsibility as responsibility for
the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter
to me;” and, “Positively, we will say that since the Other looks at me, I am responsible
for him, without even having taken on the responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility
is incumbent upon me.”52 This responsibility for the Other is imposed upon me by the
very fact that I am a human being encountering another human being. It is a
responsibility that, even if refused, cannot be avoided. It is a responsibility assumed
before, and regardless if, I even understand its full scope. It is taken on without any
expectation of reciprocity. “My responsibility is untransferable, no one could replace
me.”53 It is the infinite, unexpectedly revealed in the face of the Other, that obligates me
in this non-negotiable responsibility. This is what Levinas means by ethics.
Levinas draws on the religious trope of messianism as a way to engage ethical
desire in relation to the encounter with the face of the Other. Engaging with the face of
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the Other is to engage with their vulnerability as well as their transcending priority. The
mere presence of the face commands a responsibility. A kind of “inordinate desire”54 we
find ourselves rushing to try to fulfill, it is a desire that we place before all other
considerations. “To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other
is to give. But it is to give to the master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as
“You” [“Vous”- the “you” of majesty, in contrast with the “thou” of intimacy] in a
dimension of height.”55 It is the compulsion to take the bread our of our own mouths to
relieve the hunger of the Other. The face of the other reveals an insufficiency in the self.
It is “…a hunger that nourishes itself not with bread but with hunger itself.”56
Messianism points to the goals and activities of reducing suffering and facilitating justice
Levinas uses messianism to express the structure of this ethical desire and command.
So far, Levinas has given an account of the ethical responsibility of the Other as a
one-to-one relationship, but we do not live in a world consisting of just two. “How is it
that there is justice? ... The interpersonal relationship I establish with the Other, I must
also establish with other men; there is thus the necessity to moderate this privilege of the
Other; from whence comes justice.”57 The Other has their own others and those others
have theirs. Because we live in a society, the responsibility I have for one I also have for
everyone around me and for everyone around them. This primary desire for justice both
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moderates and complicates my responsibilities. It is from this desire that politics and the
institutions that make up human society originates. Our effort to establish societal justice
results in treating the particular as general categories. Individuals become populations
that are then divided into demographic categories. This is the negation of the radical
alterity of the Other that is subsumed into the totality. The negative impacts of the totality
consequently become a persistent and immanent possibility. The totalitarianism of Hitler
and Stalin are always just one expedient step away. Levinas recognizes this problem,
“Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in
check by the initial interpersonal relationship.”58 For there to be justice for everyone, the
delivery of that justice needs to be tempered by the mercy of the intersubjective
relationship.
B.

Temporality and Motivation

Before we can fully explicate the emergence and use of messianism in Levinas’s
philosophy, we should take note of two more of his phenomenological observations.
First, we will look at how Levinas incorporates the work of Husserl in his conception of
time. This is followed by establishing the distinctions between need, desire, and hope.
Only then can we begin to investigate what he is trying to describe by messianic hope.
For Levinas, the phenomenological experience of time is very different from any
scientific or economic understanding. Typically, we relate time to motion. The Earth
rotates on its axis and revolves around the Sun. The completion of these cycles marks our
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days and years, which are further segmented into hours, weeks, and months. This is
economic time, “where the instants are equivalent.”59 The utility of economic time is
undeniable. It enables the possibility of making appointments, setting deadlines, and
organizing our economic life. Other than the convenience of its organization, it does very
little to describe our sense of the past or our expectations of the future. The spacetime of
cosmologists does even less to describe human experience.
The human experience of time is far subtler and more immanent. When we are
suffering, time slows to a crawl and we pray for relief. Levinas writes, “The future can
bring consolation or compensation to a subject who suffers in the present, but the very
suffering of the present remains like a cry whose echo will resound forever in the eternity
of spaces.” When we are in pain, only the future can put it aside, but feeling better in the
future does not make us feel better now. In the future, we will gradually forget about the
acuteness of our current pain. “Pain cannot be redeemed…retribution in the future does
not wipe away the pains of the present.” For Levinas, economic time is an inadequate and
meaningless explanation of the inescapable temporal nature of human subjectivity
including human suffering.60
It is not that the more familiar conceptions of economic time are not valid or
useful, it is that they are irrelevant to the primal impression of temporality. Both Husserl
and Levinas in their respective phenomenologies redefine past, present, and future into
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modalities of subjectivity, they just do it in very different ways. For Husserl, the present
is not some fraction of a second between an eternal past and an endless future. Instead,
the present is a period of variable length (a width of presence) in which intuitions arise
consisting of several traits. Our experience of the present consists of a retention, a
consciousness of what has just been, and a protention, an indefinite expectation of what is
about to occur. These are intuitive, non-conscious processes that are dependent upon the
occurrent experience. Protention and retention explain surprise and musical judgment.
They should not be confused with recollection or expectation that are intentional acts in
their own right.61
Levinas’s conception of time is different from Husserl’s in that it is rooted in his
account of ethics as the intersubjective encounter. As a solitary figure, time is an endless
succession of nows, but the confrontation with the face of the Other constitutes a more
dynamic condition of time. Michael Morgan describes it as follows: “Our internal time
consciousness involves a present that contains, as it were, a present experience of a past
that was once present and a present experience of a future that is yet to be present.”62 Our
face-to-face encounter with the Other in the present is grounded in a past that is both
historical and immemorial and, at the same time, a future. Levinas writes, “Time is not a
succession of instants filing by before an I, but the response to the hope of the present,
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which is in the present is the very expression of the ‘I,’ and is the equivalent to the
present.”63 Levinas calls this event the “Time of Redemption and the Time of Justice.”64
We have already touched on the topic of the separated being. The separated being
is a needy being. We need nourishment and water. We need shelter and rest. Needs are
the requirements of life that can be satisfied at least temporarily. Needs reveal, at least to
ourselves, our own corporeal privations. Needs are distinguishable because they are
lacunae that can be self-fulfilled. They are the motivation of our instinctive drive to
engage and consume the elements of our environment. “We do not eat, drink, or play in
order that we may live; these actions are living.”65 Fulfilling our needs is a selfdemonstration of our independence and sovereignty. Levinas ties needs to economic
time: “The economic world then includes not only our so-called material life, but also all
forms of our existence in which the exigency for salvation has been traded in.”66 The first
half of this quote references the materiality and corporeality of human needs. The last
half points to a pressing demand (or desire) that is beyond satisfiable needs.
The first topic addressed by Levinas in Totality and Infinity, a text devoted to
establishing ethics as first philosophy, is distinguishing metaphysical desire from need.
“The metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely
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other.”67 Metaphysical desire is a longing for a thing forever out of reach. It is an
aspirational demand, beyond rational understanding. It grabs hold of us, we respond to it,
and it remains unfulfilled. This kind of desire is a relation without an equivalent correlate,
a relation without a relation. It is a relation with the infinite. Love, lust, concern,
generosity, and sensitivity can all be manifestations of this dynamic drive. Each of these
impulses is not only outward facing but directed at an Other. Desire is not cognitive but
affective, defying rational reduction. It is a kind of passive striving and yet it remains
dynamic.68
Unlike need, desire and hope put us in relation with transcendence. Levinas’s first
sustained discussion of a hope for the future is in Existence and Existents. This book was
published in 1947 and developed from his notes compiled from his time in a POW work
camp. The terms redemption and salvation, the topics of this section, trace their meanings
back to redemption from, or being bought out of, slavery. A life of slavery is one devoid
of freedom and filled with suffering. It is a life reduced to its economic and material
value. Our engagement with existence is effort, it is not redeemed it is only compensated.
However, “The caress of the consoler which comes softly in our pain…does not
announce any compensation,” but frees us from our “one-self” and transports us
elsewhere to find, “…‘fresh air,’ a dimension and a future.”69 To be redeemed or to be
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saved is not to be rescued from a life of pain but to be elevated from an economic thing to
transcendence. It is to be recognized as not the means to an end but as an end in itself. It
signals the ethically constituted subject; this messianic grounding of the self is to what we
now turn.
C.

An Abridged Genealogy of Messianic Hope

The economic world is about fulfilling needs. Economic time is the master tool of
efficiency. In our interactions with merchants, customers, and our coworkers, both parties
are reduced to tools for producing more stuff. Economic time is necessary for fulfilling
basic needs. “But this compensating time is not enough for hope.” When we encounter
the face of the Other, we encounter something fundamentally mysterious and beyond our
grasp. We become dislocated from economic time. Instead, we find within ourselves the
affect of an unfulfillable ethical desire. This confrontation with the trace of the infinite
results in a “traumatism of astonishment.”70 We are inexplicably commanded by a force
deep within us, “Thou shall not kill.” It is at this point that Levinas invokes the overtly
religious vocabulary of messianism. He writes, “The true object of hope is the Messiah,
or salvation.”71
Messianism and eschatology are never mentioned in Levinas’s essay from 1947,
Time and the Other. Nevertheless, temporality and messianic hope are presented within
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this work as primary products of the encounter with the Other. Temporality is generated,
or originally referenced, in the encounter with the Other. Levinas writes,
The situation of the face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of
time; the encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the
subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship. The condition of time
lies in the relationship between humans, or in history.72
In solitude, the self is entirely bound within the present or the past, and any kind of hope
is an impossibility. The flip side of the tragedy of solitude is the eruption of messianic
hope that occurs within the event of sociality. “There is not merely an opposition but an
antinomy between the despair of solitude,” and the hope for a better society.73 In solitude,
the self needs satisfaction of its material needs, while, within the social relation, the self
hopes for salvation. These two drives, while appearing contradictory, are on an equal
footing.
Levinas expands on the primordial and surprising nature of the ethical impulse in
the encounter with the face of the Other in Totality and Infinity, for which he was
awarded his habilitation in 1961. The only thing that can truly be other to the separated
being is another person. “Free beings alone can be strangers to one another.”74 Our
response to the Other is prior to any thought. Automatically we say, “good morning.”
This response reveals our responsibility and our messianic hope. Levinas writes,
The first ‘vision’ of eschatology (hereby distinguished from the revealed
opinions of positive religions) reveals the very possibility of eschatology,
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that is, the breach of the totality, the possibility of a signification without a
context. The experience of morality does not proceed from this vision ˗ it
consummates this vision; ethics is an optics. But it is a ‘vision’ without
image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision;75
This vision of eschatology is not of the logical, thematized, totalized version. It is not the
vision that breaks everything down into its constituent parts and then sorts them into
categories. This “signification without context” is a vision without perspective or sense of
place. It is an openness that takes in the whole and is receptive to unexpected
relationships. It is an intuition that does not require, and cannot abide, rigorous
definitions and strict classifications. It is a vision that can ‘hear’ the truth in a myth and
can feel the exhilaration of transcendence. This is an eschatology not of an end but of an
eternity. This is messianic salvation without divinity or necessity. Confronted with
alterity, we open the door and say, “welcome.” We act morally not because it is the
logical thing to do but, in an attempt, to fulfill our ethical desire.
In 1974, Levinas published his second master work, Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence. In this, his later period, he rarely refers to messianism or eschatology
within his so-called philosophical writings. It is not that he has lost interest or abandoned
the concept. Messianism comes up frequently in interviews and remains a topic in his
Talmudic essays.76 Within his philosophical writings, Levinas keeps the concept of
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messianism vital by subsuming it within the concept of diachrony.77 It is beyond the
scope of this essay to understand the motivations for this linguistic change. It is enough to
note the change and his elaboration of the topic. Levinas borrows the term ‘diachronic’
from linguistics where it is often paired with ‘synchronic.’ In the linguistic context,
synchrony describes how words change and take on different meanings between two or
more speakers during a specific period. Diachrony refers to how words change and take
on different meanings over the course of time. Levinas puts both words, but particularly
diachrony, to a different use.
Levinas uses the words ‘diachrony’ and ‘diachronic’ to refer to the disruption that
occurs to our sense of time and the sense of ourselves when we encounter the Other. “All
human experience does in fact take on a temporal form.”78 It takes on a special form
when we encounter the face of the Other; time is transformed from an endless succession
of presents, a flow of nows, into something grander. “This is a peculiar sort of
transcendence; it is the time of the other.”79 It is not just that the self is in some way
asynchronous with the Other; it is that this encounter transforms, shakes, or indeed
constitutes the self. Commanded by the face of the Other in the present, the self is
obligated to consider an Other with a mysterious past. “For Levinas, I only awaken to a
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story not my own.”80 The presence of the Other makes the self-aware of a non-present
that is immemorial, unrepresentable, invisible, and an-archical.81 Before any word is
spoken the Other is present, in the present, before the self. This presence generates and
reifies temporality to the self. At the same time, it is a revelation of the priority and
alterity of the other to the self. “The transcending diachrony of time indicates that the
other’s time is not just separate, but superior.”82 This creates a non-reciprocal,
asymmetric relationship with the Other, imposing a responsibility on the self for the
suffering of the Other. “In this responsibility I am thrown back toward what has never
been my thought or deed, toward what has never been in my power or freedom, toward
what has never been my presence, and has never come into memory.”83 The past, the
future, and the present all cohabitate in the experience of the Other, electing and
transforming the self even as this confrontation elicits new desires and commands new
duties. This is messianic hope by a new name.
This disruption of time and eruption of ethical desire instills Levinas’s
messianism with paradoxes and surprises. The messianic era is not in the future but
always occurring in the present. It is an eschatology without an eschaton. It is a
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messianism in which everyone is a potential Messiah and at the same time only the self
can be the Messiah. Messianic hope is a hope that is unrealizable both in the political
collective and in the individual instance, yet we cling to its trace. Michael Morgan
explains, “When we respond to these obligations, individually in episodes of kindness
and concerns and collectively in practices of justice and generosity, we give our personal
and collective temporal and historical lives what meaning they have.”84 We might ask, if
relieving the suffering of the Other gives my life meaning, then who is the Messiah, the
self or the Other?85
In 1961, the first topic Levinas addressed in Totality and Infinity was desire. The
very last thing he wrote for this work was the Preface. In this Preface, he provides a
sustained discussion of the philosophical role he gives to eschatology and messianism. In
this context, when Levinas speaks of the eschatological, he is not speaking of “the end”
of history or a future spiritual era. He is addressing the most prominent events and
recollections of history: war and peace. He accepts that the idea that war and peace are
mutually conditioned on the possibility of one another. Individuals and states can choose
to abandon their morality and they will when they feel threatened. The non-reciprocal
obligations incumbent upon the self mean that the self can never rely upon the peaceful
intentions of the Other.
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On one level Levinas’s argument is dependent upon two conditions. First, that the
present is more than the fraction of a second happening right now. It is really an intuition
that the past, the present, and the future are interrelated in the now. This idea has sources
in both Edmund Husserl and Franz Rosenzweig. Second, the encounter with the face of
the Other is an event of consequence. This event constitutes the subjective self and
generates the affect of ethical desire. It should not be a surprise that Levinas resorts to the
religious language of messianism to explicate what he means by ethical desire. The
metaphysical desire that Levinas invokes is an affect of our human nature that is not
amenable to the language of logic or psychology. Maimonides taught that messianic hope
is not mysterious or supernatural but is focused on the world in which we live. Our
encounter with other commands us to take responsibility for the suffering of the Other
and the Other’s other. The non-mystical, practical activity of Kabbalah is the individual’s
responsibility for the world. This event engages or partners the self with the infinite. This
simple concept of messianic hope is only simple, if the description is includes the
language of metaphor, poetry, or religion. This being said, is it useful, or even possible,
to use hope to establish ethics as first philosophy? In the next section, three different
critics will uncover some possibilities.
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Three Approaches to Levinas’s Messianism
A.

Terrence Holden

Instead of looking at Levinas’s work as a whole, Terrence Holden, in his volume
Levinas, Messianism, and Parody, chooses to concentrate his analysis on the use of the
concept of messianism in Levinas’s philosophical writings. Holden’s concern is
principally on the role that messianism plays in contemporary continental philosophy and
Levinas’s influence on that role. By concentrating on the philosophical works, he
attempts to understand the legitimacy of the use of religious motif in a secular
philosophical text. His thesis is that there are three distinct forms of messianism
represented in the body of Levinas’s work. The first form appears in Time and the Other
and Existence and Existents, both originally published in 1947. Totality and Infinity is the
primary example of the second form, although the form also appears in several essays
from the early 1960’s. The third form is obliquely represented in Otherwise than Being
and other essays from the later period of Levinas’s life. He argues that these three periods
feature unique versions of messianism and that it is misguided to harmonize them.86
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In the first form, the messianic horizon appears or opens up with the presence of
the other person. In these earlier works, it is just the acknowledgement or the acceptance
of the presence of the Other in proximity to the self that reveals the subjective self to
consciousness. This is a profound realization. Holden writes, “The other signifies namely
as the concrete embodiment of that which is radically beyond the dimension of the
possibility of the monad…. Beyond death or impossibility, the other signifies as the
radical future, as the advent of absolute surprise.”87 The Other signifies something
beyond the solitude of the finite self. This radical surprise is the possibility of a type of
time that is not economic but experientially eschatological. It is focused on the future.
Levinas reprises the theme of escape from his pre-war essay, On Escape. Levinas writes,
“In weariness we want to escape existence itself.”88 To the desire for escape, he adds the
yearning for salvation or redemption from our solitude. He writes not only of the
“exigency for salvation” but also, “All the acuteness of hope in the midst of despair
comes from the exigency that the very instant of despair be redeemed.”89 Only because of
the presence of the Other does it become possible to foresee the possibility of a better
future, a future that is not solitary suffering. Holden asserts, “the messianic figure of
alterity par excellence in these early texts is that of the feminine.”90 The feminine, along
with the erotic relation and the caress, serve to distinguish this form from subsequent
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ones. He also notes that absence of any direct Jewish references despite plenty of
religious references to redemption, resurrection, and salvation. The argument that these
are distinguishing characteristics is disputed by others as we will discuss below.
After 1947 and for the next several years, Levinas’s focused on the study of
Talmud and other Jewish texts with Mordechai Chouchani, a Jewish educator of which
little is certain. Levinas’s first major master work, Totality and Infinity, appears after this
period. Holden identifies this as the second principal form of messianism within
Levinas’s work. Messianism and the “eschatology of peace” are featured in both the
Preface and concluding sections of this work. Holden acknowledges that issues
surrounding the erotic relation, fecundity, and the feminine are examined in greater detail
here, but are “nonetheless subject to demotion.” He writes, “The relation with the
feminine becomes a partial relaxation of the moral rigour imposed upon the self.”
Metaphysical desire is downgraded to a form of need.91 Holden instead highlights the
concept of the infinite. He notes, “Levinas appropriates the idea of the infinite from
Descartes.” Not to prove the existence of the divine but to reveal the possibility of an
event that cannot be subsumed by consciousness. He quotes Levinas, “Infinity overflows
the thought that thinks it…[and it is] the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the
face of the Other.” The infinite signified in the face of the Other establishes the
eschatological relation with the self. The relation is reified through the medium of
language. He understands this work as targeting any kind of theodicy, “and especially the

91

Ibid. 81.

38

Hegelian model of historical teleology, in which present suffering could be sacrificed for
the future.” The relation with the infinite, initiated by the face of the Other, transforms
the telos of the subjective self. The goal is no longer to escape existence or endure the
ontology of war. Instead, something more active is demanded of the self. Eschatological
peace demands that the self stand in moral judgement of every moment of history.
Holden interprets this fresh presentation as the distinguishing feature of the second form
of Levinas’s messianism.92
The thrust of Otherwise of Being is toward explicating the self instead of the
relation between the self and the Other as it is in Totality and Infinity. The
phenomenological focus is on how the self is affected by the Other. Messianism is not
even mentioned in the later work. The concept is conjured obliquely in the metaphors that
Levinas uses to describe the self. Holden writes that the language of messianism goes
through “…a passage to the messianism of the self, the subject as ‘suffering servant,’
whose language is that of ‘persecution,’ ‘hostageship,’ ‘obsession,’ ‘substitution’,
‘expiation,’ ‘martyrdom,’ etc.”93 This change in vocabulary is the most obvious
difference between the second and third form according to Holden. Instead of relying on
seeing the face to signify alterity of the Other and language to establish relationship, there
is an expansion of sensibility. Holden writes that the relation with the Other, “…takes
place across the ‘exposure’ and ‘vulnerability’ of the self to the other.”94 He interprets
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this as a furthering and heightening of the sanctification of the “humanity of the human”
from the merely human.95 This charged description leads to something quite small.
Holden writes, “The ‘enormity’ of the relationship with the Other is required as the
condition of possibility without which a thing as ‘politeness’ and ‘courtesy’ would be
possible.”96 The somewhat disconcerting conclusion of Holden’s analysis of Otherwise
than Being is that it, “…serves in Levinas to articulate the transcendental reduction of
politeness.”97
When Holden writes, “Levinas’ [sic] philosophy is not essentially messianic…[it]
takes on an idiosyncratic character in function of certain exigencies determinative for his
work.”98 He understands Levinas as specifically using messianism to create a dynamic of
sanctification of the human, a kind of humanism. He argues, “The dynamic of the
sanctification constitutes…the setting apart of the human from the inhuman, of the
‘creating a fence’ for the human.”99 All of this is without question; however, most readers
would think that much more is at stake than a deeper understanding of politeness.
Further, by neglecting Levinas’s discussions of messianism in writings and interviews
after Otherwise than Being, dismissing them as religious, he misunderstands how
necessary messianism is to Levinas’s thought. Finally, his thesis that three distinct forms
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of messianism are represented in Levinas’s philosophical works lacks weight. Without
doubt, there is an evolution in the language, but nothing about the earlier versions is
negated by the later. Each of Levinas’s philosophical essays are meant to fulfill a distinct
purpose. To fulfill that purpose, he uses a tool borrowed from his Jewish heritage but
stripped of religious particularity. He uses that tool differently in each case. While that
tool is used to justify the polite “after you” when entering a door, it also motivates the
hope for a world with the possibility of less suffering. A subtler understanding of
Levinas’s messianic evolution is presented by Martin Kavka.
B.

Martin Kavka

Martin Kavka is another close reader of Levinas. Like most scholars of Levinas,
he considers all of Levinas’s writings, both philosophic and religious, as a single body of
work, using one genre to interpret the other. He is a sympathetic critic who sees many of
the shortfalls of messianism, but instead of seeing several distinct versions of
messianism, he interprets Levinas’s messianism as evolving different affective and
functional valences over time. Kavka sees a transition from the immediate post-war
period through the first master-work, Totality and Infinity, and a subtler, more mature
version emerging in Otherwise Than Being and afterward. The messianic ideal is
expressed throughout the post-war period, but Levinas has a different mode of expression
and different philosophical and rhetorical purposes. Kavka refers to these variations in his
presentation as temperaments. Ultimately, he questions the validity and efficacy of the
messianic concept altogether.
Kavka interprets Levinas’s discussion of messianism in Existence and Existents as
a meditation on hope and as a relief from the solitary suffering of existence in the present.
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He writes, “Levinas also began to think about whether belief in future messianic arrival,
and not just actual messianic arrival, could assuage the sufferer in her suffering.”100
Neither Kavka nor Levinas believe that unsubstantiated hope may provide true relief to
the sufferer. Several times, Kavka refers to this hope as “ridiculous.” And Levinas writes,
“retribution in the future does not wipe away the pains of the present.” Nevertheless,
there is the acknowledgement that “the sufferer seems to need some kind of recourse
now,” and consequently, this hope for salvation “does not seem to us indispensable.” The
source of this hope is the central event of Levinas’s account of subjectivity, that is the
engagement of the subjective self with the Other. This engagement reminds the sufferer
that they are not defined by the suffering in the present. This release comes from the
“caress of the consoler” and is “infinitely mysterious.”101 It is deeply rooted in the
experience of eros and fecundity. Kavka calls Levinas’s hope for salvation “messianic
procreation.”102
Kavka suggests that there are two ways to understand the role of messianism in
Totality and Infinity. The first as a natural intensification or deepening of the idea of
messianic procreation. The long sections of this work, discussing paternity and maternity,
justify the possibility of “quasi-immortality…that ensures that my journey through time
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and across generations will not come to an end.”103 Kavka questions the persuasiveness
of this explanation. Procreation does not provide any certainty of the triumph of the good
over evil, any kind of quasi-immortality, or immortality by proxy. Because these
arguments arise within the body of Totality and Infinity, I think these sections concerning
fecundity are demonstrative evidence of experiencing the establishment of the ethical
self. Maternity is the example of the ethical-self par excellence. Kavka’s second
explanation seems to have much more credence. Kavka writes,
…in and through our acts in which we concretize our responsibility to
others by giving them life (by ‘not being for death’ and taking ourselves to
be under divine judgement), we take each other as free agents. That in and
of itself is sufficient to transform our world into one that is peaceful and
looks as if it were governed by a messianic ruler.104
In other words, our responsible actions towards the Other, whether they regard the
stranger, the widow, the orphan, or our own children, have messianic weight. As
supporting evidence, Kavka points to Levinas’s essay Messianic Texts, written
contemporaneously with Totality and Infinity. It is here that Levinas writes, “…good
deeds are efficacious. That is the Messiah.”105 Levinas brings messianic action into the
world of human affairs and excising divine will from the concept in both his
philosophical and religious writings.
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As has been noted, Levinas avoids using the word messianic in Otherwise than
Being. Kavka, along with others,106 attributes this rhetorical change as a response to the
comments of Derrida in his essay Violence and Metaphysics. Derrida is all for abolishing
political violence but does not believe it can be abolished with violence. Derrida writes,
“…an end cannot be stated, eschatology is not possible, except through violence.”107
Somehow, people with long histories of subjugation, resentments, and cultures of
violence must be brought to the side of peace. If the origin of messianic peace can only
be brought about through acts of war, then someone, or some group, will have to be
defeated and left resentful. Levinas’s solution is to remove God and divine action from
the concept messianism and history. Messianism, in his philosophical writings, is
removed altogether and replaced with a principle of human action in history. “To be a
messianist is to say that our lives and the lives of our descendants can be better in the
future. We can engage in certain acts that make us confident, but not certain, that ‘later’
can be better than ‘now.’”108 In Otherwise than Being, the messianic becomes completely
subsumed into the transcendence and disruption of diachrony. It is in the diachronic
moment, when we accept full responsibility for the suffering of the Other and “…take the
bread out of one's own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one's own
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fasting.”109 Kavka carefully notes that, just because Levinas does not use the word
messianism in his philosophical writings, does not mean he has abandoned the concept.
He cites his later Talmudic essays and his interview with Phillippe Nemo where Levinas
says “…to be worthy of the messianic era one must admit that ethics has a meaning, even
without the promises of the Messiah.”110
Martin Kavka provides us with a modern history of messianism within Jewish
philosophy. Starting with Maimonides he shows that messianism is a philosophy of
privation. Privation is not negation, negation is definitional. The statement “men cannot
give birth” is a negation, it is not a privation. “Those men are bald” is an example of a
privation, they could have hair, but they do not. The pre-messianic is about privation, a
world with a missing attribute of the ideal. Jewish messianism is about the possibilities, it
is about something that could be but is not yet. The presence of violence in human
society points to a privation and is not a defining feature. Kavka writes, “The nature of
human being is to be not yet, to be deprived of the stasis of being, to hunger after it, and
to work to engender it. This sets the stage for a view of religious life as centered on
messianic anticipation.”111 For Maimonides, Herman Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, as well
as Levinas, this anticipation is fundamental to the human condition. It is more than just
being tired and hungry. It is a desire to surpass a finite existence measured by a ticking
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clock. Levinas writes, “It is not enough that tears be wiped away or death avenged; no
tear is to be lost, no death be without a resurrection.”112 Jewish messianism is faith that
the human condition is not condemned to violence and injustice, that it is possible to live
in a better world. Scholem summarizes “…in Judaism the Messianic idea has compelled
a life lived in deferment, in which nothing can be done definitely, nothing can be
irrevocably accomplished. One may say, perhaps, the Messianic idea is the real antiexistentialist idea.”113
Kavka is not keen on a life lived in deferment, but Levinas seems to relish its
indeterminateness. There is an ambiguity in the intersubjective relationship regarding the
identity of the Messiah. Kavka explains, “It is difficult to pin down exactly who the
messianic agent is, since redemption – both the other person and of myself – is
guaranteed through my own ethical action. In a radical sense, human agency has
messianic force.”114 There is an ethically responsible self who both is and awaits the
Messiah.115 The relationship between the self and the Other resists any kind of
thematization or totalization. The eruption of messianic hope within the diachronic
moment constitutes self as both saved and savior. Levinas is aware of this oscillation
between two poles and explicitly reveals it in the teacher/student relationship. “To have
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meaning is to teach or be taught.”116 Even more explicitly, he writes, “The pupil-teacher
relationship, which seemingly remains rigorously intellectual, contains all the riches of a
meeting with the Messiah.”117 For Levinas, this equivocation is not a bug but a feature.
Kavka’s strongest criticisms of Levinas’s messianism focus on the very efficacy
of messianic hope. He echoes Scholem’s complaint that messianism results in “a life
lived in deferment.” Particularly, “…the messianic idea makes impossible a certain kind
of philosophical activity,” namely “the determination of a concept’s true and a historical
meaning.”118 Messianism is such a loaded term, that has been defined and redefined so
many times, and it carries such emotional and historical baggage that its true meaning
and value is obscured. It is always and already revolutionary, apocalyptic, and restorative
and, at the same time, none of these things. It is neither fish nor fowl. As a concept, it
lives on the border of history and non-temporality, neither is it immanent nor is it
transcendent.119 Setting definitions aside, he strenuously questions messianism’s
usefulness. Kavka writes “What happens, in short, when victory is deferred even further
into the future, and time marches on as one failure after another? How does one go on?
Was messianic desire simply ever a mode of self-deception?”120 He argues that the,
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“…notion of messianism as something that can be ‘achieved’ is overly rosy.” That the
actual expression of messianism can only be in the moment and not reside in some
unfulfillable hope for the future. Further, that this expression can take one of two forms.
First, as a simple act of kindness or justice for the suffering Other. Second, as “…acts of
critique, in which we show that certain norms that hold sway in our culture are not
necessarily justified.”121 This allows anyone to participate in messianic acts in either or
both a private and a public manner. It does mean, however, that true redemption is
hopeless.
C.

John D. Caputo

John D. Caputo is more an interpreter of Jacques Derrida than a reader of Levinas.
Derrida was both influenced by and an influencer of Levinas. This positions Caputo to
provide a clear-eyed view of Levinas’s work. Levinas’s messianism is a concept that
Derrida absorbed and transformed into his own. As Caputo explicates and deconstructs
Derrida, he thereby reveals his personal position and, by necessity, he does the same with
Levinas. As a philosopher in his own right, he orients himself in a space that could just as
well describe Levinas’s. Caputo writes, “I describe myself as a philosopher who tries to
occupy the distance between philosophy and theology.”122 His work allows him to
engage in dialogue with both Derrida and Levinas.
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Derrida interprets Levinas’s messianism as “…one of among several means of
expressing the alterity of the other as an otherness not relative to the ‘same,’ but as pure
otherness imposing itself upon the same.”123 For Levinas, the other is totally other (tout
autre) and cannot be absorbed or possessed by the subjective self. The absolutism of this
totalizing is problematic. Levinas’s presentation of the Other “…cannot be simply and
absolutely tout autre.”124 This is Caputo’s and Derrida’s fundamental criticism of
Levinas. To explicate this position, Caputo describes both Levinas and Derrida as
heterologists, scholars of difference but with two different Nietzschean orientations.
Levinas is a heteronomist. Heteronomists are pious, grave, responsive, responsible, and
respectful of the law. Caputo (and Derrida) are heteromorphists. Heteromorphists are
impious, insouciant, Dionysiac, and lovers of novelty.125 Levinas’s project, his
messianism, has only one hope, a world without war and mass murder. Caputo is
suspicious of any human program with a singular proscription. It is not that he is against
the hope, he loves the hope, but he is critical of the method. Caputo writes,
For Levinas, it is not politics that is first philosophy but ethics; politics on
the other hand is war. (That is not a deconstruction of politics, I think, but
a riding roughshod over it that will not do because it does not take account
of the fact that we are always inside/outside political totalities.)126
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By desacralizing everything but the human and thus making the one commandment,
“thou shall not kill,” absolute, Levinas is totalizing the infinite. Any attempt to use the
finite resources of language to contain the infinite is resorting to a kind of violence. For
Caputo, the impossibility of Levinas’s project is made manifest in his attempt to
articulate it.
Caputo understands Levinas as engaged in a kind of prophetic hyperbole. “The
work of Levinas comes over us today like the voice of an Old Testament prophet, like the
cry of Amos demanding that justice flow over the land like water.” By bringing
messianism to philosophy, Levinas is not trying to create some new philosophical
category. Instead, he is trying to orient ethical thought toward an ideal that makes the
effort worthwhile. Caputo thinks that Levinas should be exempt from some scientific
standard of empirical truth. “We do not believe the stories that prophets tell, and it is a
degradation and a distortion of prophetic discourse to treat it as a record of eyewitness
events.”127 There is a tension here. While Caputo is comfortable with relativizing of the
prophetic, he sees a problem in the sanctification of the human, the project of “creating a
fence.” Holden, in contrast, does not see this as problematic and it may be its strength.128
Levinas is a prophet, but not a seer. He is not predicting a future and certainly not a future
with an eschaton. Caputo writes,
The messianic idea turns on a certain structural openness, undecidability,
unaccomplishment, non-occurrence, noneventuality, which sees to it that,
in contrast to the way things transpire in ordinary time, things are never
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finished, that the last word is never spoken. Were the messiah ever to
show up, that indiscretion would ruin the whole idea of the messianic.129
The impossibility of Levinas’s vision is precisely what makes it worthy of consideration.
This impossibility of Levinas’s impossible aspiration is the feature that Caputo
finds the most attractive. Messianic hope for Caputo is rooted (if rooted is the right word)
in faith. The reason ‘rooted’ might not be the right word is because both hope and faith,
like messianism and God, are transcendent terms without grounds. Caputo does not have
synchronous definitions of faith and hope but, instead, has a relationship with their
concepts. Any firm definitions would not do them justice, because they overflow the
concepts they represent. Instead, they are experiences that should be taken on their own
terms that is to be lived.
Once one understands messianic hope as the affirmative repetition of oui,
oui, as the passion for the impossible and as the l'invention de l'autre, one
discovers that hope has been a consistent, albeit not explicitly-named
theme, throughout Caputo's philosophy of religion.130
Both Levinas and Caputo desire the disruption of a messianic hope. However, they
understand their messianic hope in different ways. “For Caputo, hope and faith correlate
precisely at the point where each expresses the necessity for individuals to anticipate the
future.”131 The faith of religion, in Caputo’s case, is the hope of a messianic future.
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Levinas understands his messianic hope not being tied to faith but as a primal part
of the phenomena of being human. Hoping for a better future, hoping for a future with
less suffering, is an affective part of our encounter with the Other. While the conception
of messianism has an origin in Judaism, Levinas is not calling on any Jewish myth or text
to justify his messianic hope within his philosophical texts. His eschatology is not
dependent upon the divine in any way. Levinas is not hoping for God to send a Messiah.
For Levinas, the Messiah has “always already” been here with us when we acknowledge
the presence of the Other. The messianic era is not the end of time but the end of actuality
of war. The hope for a world of peace is not faith but the project of every human being,
most especially, philosophers. He writes, “Of peace there can be only an eschatology. But
this does not mean that when affirmed objectively it is believed by faith instead of being
known by knowledge.”132
By the time Levinas writes Otherwise than Being, at least in part as a response to
Derrida, he has largely dropped messianic terms from his philosophical writings. Instead,
he focuses all his messianic energy on the future. And not on, “…a past that cannot be
remembered, recollected, brought to mind, an ‘immemorable’ past, ‘more’ past than any
memorable or recuperable past.”133 Neither Levinas nor Caputo is interested in restoring
some idealized era in history. Their messianism is articulated in the hope for a future free
of war. They would both agree that, “The very openness of the future calls upon us,
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solicits us, invites us to open ourselves to an unexpected visitation. Hope is not caused by
a being or founded on a ground of being, but motivated by an otherwise-than-being, a
not-yet-being.”134 They both see a distant future, in which they will take no part, as still
being of the highest importance and motivation for themselves.
It is worth noting that both Caputo and Levinas consider themselves religious
practitioners. Caputo situates himself in that space of the Venn diagram over which both
philosophy and religion coexist but have many issues exclusively their own. For Levinas
religion and philosophy largely occupy the same space, each bring unique tools to the
analysis of the experience of human life. He asserts, “Religion’s recourse to philosophy
need indicate neither servility nor lack of understanding on the part of religion.”135 He
adds elsewhere, “This indicates that there is communication between faith and
philosophy and not the notorious conflict.”136 For both, messianic hope cannot be
disqualified as a philosophical term just because it lacks grounds, has a biblical origin, or
is a transcendent term. Messianic hope is a fundamental feature of the human experience.
To eliminate it from philosophical discourse would be the same as suggesting terms such
as love, justice, the good, and the infinite are not valid philosophical terms because they
lack empirical foundations.
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Conclusion
Levinas’s messianism is drawn from a family of ideas with a deep Jewish
tradition stretching back 2,500 years. He alters it in some key respects. It is never
dependent upon God or a god but, instead, calls to some trace of the infinite. This appeal,
interrogation, or relationship is of a cognitive concept that exceeds the cognitive ability of
any thinker. The infinite is a placeholder without a place in the work of mathematicians
and physicists as well as, within the work of Descartes, Maimonides, and among the
Kabbalists. Levinas’s messianic ideal relies on an altered experience of temporality.
Instead of an endless succession of nows, the present, the past, and the future are
experienced in relationship with one another in a way that would be, at least,
understandable to Rosenzweig or an orthodox phenomenologist. The self is at the same
time, elevated to a full partner of the divine and lowered to the destitution of a persecuted
hostage. The Messiah fluctuates between the poles of the subjective self and any other
Other. The messianic era is simultaneously always in the future and already in the
present, lasting for only a moment and forever. For Levinas, the encounter with the Other
is the well of hope, equally at home in both Athens and Jerusalem.
Is this kind of hope a satisfactory philosophical strategy? It is an intersubjective
call.
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